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This article examines the strict liability o#ence Of the possession Of objectionable publications
in s 131 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 ("FVPCA"). The use
of strict liability in relation to the possession €#ence was criticised during the passing Of the
FVPCA. This article explores .,ftilly the criticisms that can be made about the use of strict
liability generally and, spec#ically in the context Of censorship legislation.
I THE FVPCA SCHEME
A. The O#ence Provisions
The FVPCA contains several offences which enforce the censorship regime. The first
group of offences cover the making and supply of objectionable and restricted publications.
Sections 124 and 127 require that a defendant have knowledge of or reasonable cause to
believe a publication which she supplies is objectionable.1 Sections 123 and 126 also cover
the supply of objectionable publications but these offences are strict liability in the sense
that it is no defence that the defendant had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to believe
* This paper was submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme.
1 Objectionable publications: s 124; restricted publications: s 127.
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that the publication was objectionable.2 The possession offence in s 131, however, is only
phrased in terms of strict liability:3
s131 Offence to possess objectionable publication-
(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5) of this section, every person commits an offence
against this Act who, without lawful authority or excuse, has in that person's
possession an objectionable publication.
(2) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) of this section ks
liable to a fine not exceeding,--
(a) In the case of an individual, $2,000:
(b) In the case of a body corporate, $5,000
(3) It shall be no defence to a charge under subsection (1) of this section that the
defendant had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to believe that the
publication to which the charge relates was objectionable.
The effect of s 131(3) is that the Crown need prove only that a person is in possession of
a publication. If that publication is determined by the censorship bodies to be objectionable
then that person will be convicted. It is not necessary that a person be convicted of an
offence before a publication can be confiscated. There is an independent power to seize and
destroy publications which are determined to be objectionable.4
B What is Objectionable?
Section 3 of the FVPCA defines when a publication is objectionable:
s3 Meaning of "objectionable" -
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a publication is objectionable if it describes, depicts,
expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or
violence in such a manner that the availability of the publication is likely to be
injurious to the public good.
(2) A publication shall be deemed to be objectionable for the purposes of this Act if
the publication promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support,--
2 Objectionable publications: s 123; restricted publications: s 126. These offences carry a lessor
penalty than those involving knowledge.
3 Sections 131(4) - 131(8) omitted.
4 Sections 107, 108 and 116.
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(a) The exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, for sexual purposes;
or
(b) The use of violence or coercion to compel any person to participate in, or
submit to, sexual conduct; or
(c) Sexual conduct with or upon the body of a dead person; or
(d) The use of urine or excrement in association with degrading or dehumanising
conduct or sexual conduct; or
(e) Bestiality; or
( f) Acts of torture or the infliction of extreme violence or extreme cruelty.
(3) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication
(other than a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) b
objectionable or should be given a classification other than objectionable,
particular weight shall be given to the extent and degree to which, and the
manner in which, the publication--
(a) Describes, depicts, or otherwise deals with--
(i) Acts of torture, the infliction of serious physical harm, or acts of
significant cruelty:
(ii) Sexual violence or sexual coercion, or violence or coercion in association
with sexual conduct:
(iii) Other sexual or physical conduct of a degrading or dehumanising or
demeaning nature:
(iv) Sexual conduct with or by children, or young persons, or both:
(v) Physical conduct in which sexual satisfaction is derived from inflicting or
suffering cruelty or pain:
(b) Exploits the nudity of children, or young persons, or both:
(c) Degrades or dehumanises or demeans any person:
(d) Promotes or encourages criminal acts or acts of terrorism:
(e) Represents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any
particular class of the public are inherently inferior to other members of the
public by reason of any characteristic of members of that class, being a
characteristic that is a prohibited ground of discrimination specified in section
21 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1993.
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(4) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication
(other than a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is
objectionable or should be given a classification other than objectionable, the
following matters shall also be considered:
(a) The dominant effect of the publication as a whole:
(b) The impact of the medium in which the publication is presented:
(c) The character of the publication, including any merit, value, or importance
that the publication has in relation to literary, artistic, social, cultural,
educational, scientific, or other matters:
(d) The persons, classes of persons, or age groups of the persons to whom the
publication is intended or is likely to be made available:
(e) The purpose for which the publication is intended to be used:
(f) Any other relevant circumstances relating to the intended or likely use of the
publication.
The Film and Literature Board of Review ("the Board") and the High Court have recently
examined how this section operates.5 The Board considered that s 3(1) is a governing or
umbrella definition of objectionable. A publication is objectionable if it deals with matters
of sex, crime, horror, cruelty or violence in such a manner that the availability of the
publication is likely to be injurious to the public good. The words "injurious to the public
good" are retained from the previous censorship legislation,6 although the Board considered
that a new interpretation of this phrase was required because "Parliament has signalled a
departure from the old regime".7
The Board noted the FVPCA "creates an entirely new method of discerning when the
public good is likely to be injured.'18 The Act provides for a two-tiered system of determining
whether a publication is objectionable.
Publications which contain any of the characteristics listed in s 3(2) are deemed to be
objectionable. That is, if any publication "'promotes or supports, or tends to promote or
5 New Truth & TV Extra (4 November 1994 issue) (1996) 3 HRNZ 162, News Media Ltd v Film and
Literature Board ofReview Unreported, 11 June 1997, High Court, Wellington Registry, AP197/96,
McGechan & Goddard JJ.
6 Indecent Publications Act 1963, s2 (repealed); Films Act 1983, s13 (repealed); Video Recordings
Act 1987, s2 (repealed).
7 NeW Truth above n 5,169.
8 New Truth above n 5,169.
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support" any of the activities in s 3(2) then Parliament has deemed that the availability of
the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good and the censor is obliged to
classify it as objectionable.'
The censor is not permitted to consider whether availability of the publication would in
fact be injurious to the public good, as subs 3(3) carves out an automatic deeming provision
from the umbrella definition in subs 3(1). The censor is also not permitted to consider the
contextual criteria provided subs 3(4), such as the dominant effect of the publication as a
whole.
The High Court confirmed this approach to the automatic deeming provision. It did note,
however, that there may be some 'coincidental overlap' of the first and second tiers. The
Court said that when enquiring into whether a publication tends to promote or support any
s 3(2) activity, "it cannot be done without considering the extent, degree and manner in
which the publication deals with the activity".10 It may also be necessary to consider the
impact of the medium. The Court did qualify this by saying this coincidental applicability is
only to determine whether a publication tends to support the activities in s 3(2), does not
raise up the full range of s 3(3) and (4) factors, and the greater or lesser degree of
coincidental common ground will depend on the particular circumstances of the case.11
If a publication does not fall within the absolute prohibition carved out by subs 3(2),
then the second tier criteria must be considered. Under the second tier a publication may be
classified as unrestricted, objectionable, or objectionable except in certain circumstances.12
In this way a publication may still be determined to be objectionable even if it survives the
subsection 3(2) criteria. The Board noted this was the intention of the Minister of Women's
Affairs' when she introduced the Bill to Parliament.13 Sections 3(3) and (4) simply provide
9 New Truth above n 5, 169. The Law Commission considers that generally the word 'deems'
creates a legal fiction. It makes something in law that which it is not: The New Zealand Law
Commission Legislation Manual: Structure and Style - Report 35 (Wellington 1996) 42. This is what is
achieved by s 3(2), as the availability of publications which promote or support those activities
are regarded as being injurious to the public good, whether or not they actually are.
10 News Media, above n 5, 12.
11 News Media, above n 5, 12.
12 A publication that is objectionable except in certain circumstances is referred to as a restricted
publication, and may, for example, be restricted to persons over a specified age, restricted person
or class of person (such as the particular importer), or restricted to a specified purpose (such as a
particular Film Festival or academic research); see s 23 FVPCA. If a publication is restricted it is
not covered by the possession offence in s 131.
13 New Truth above n 5,6, citing Hon Jenny Shipley, MP 532 (1992) NZPD 12 760.
456 (1997) 27 VUWLR
the criteria for deciding whether the availability of a publication is likely to be injurious to
the public good under the governing subsection.
Section 3(3) requires that particular weight be given to the extent, degree, and manner in
which a publication deals with certain violent and sexual acts, exploitation of young
persons, degradation of people, promotion of criminal activity, and representation of classes
of people as inferior. Section 3(4) provides for other factors that must also be considered,
such as dominant effect and artistic merit. The section (3)(4) does not, however, require that
'particular weight' be given to these factors as compared to the factors in the subsection (3).
These criteria provide the framework in which the censor determines whether the
'availability' of a publication is injurious to the public good. Although the phrase 'likely to
be injurious to the public good' is familiar from previous Acts, 'availability' is not. Even
though the rewording is subtle, the focus has changed from whether the publication itself is
injurious to the public good, to whether its availability is injurious to the public good.14
C The Process for Deciding Whether a Publication is Objectionable
Where the character of a publication arises in a civil or criminal proceeding, the Office
of Film and Literature Classification ("the Office") has sole jurisdiction to determine
whether a publication is objectionable.15
In a proceeding where the publication in issue has already been classified, the subsisting
decision of the Office is conclusive proof of whether a publication is objectionable.16 A
person who is charged with an offence can apply under s 41(2)to have an earlier decision
reconsidered if the decision was made more than a year earlier.17
In a criminal proceeding where the publication has not been classified, or the accused
wishes to challenge an existing decision under s 41(2), the Court must refer the matter to the
Office for determination. All parties to the proceeding have the right to make a written
submission to the Office in respect of the classification of that publication.18 Also entitled to
make written submissions are the Secretary for Internal Affairs, people with an interest in
the publication such as owner, maker, distributor, or publisher, and any other people who
14 New Truth above n 5,170.
15 Section 29(1).
16 Section 41(1); this is subject to the resolution of any reviews or appeals allowed under ss 42,47,
and 58. A copy of the register recording that decision and certification from the Office that the
decision is still in force is sufficient proof of that decision: s 29(3).
17 Reconsideration of a decision by persons other than someone charged is only permitted if the
decision was made three years earlier, and the Chief Censor gives leave to do so: s 42.
18 Section 20(2).
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satisfy the Chief Censor that they are likely to be affected by the publication.19 Otherwise
there is no general right to appear before, or to be heard by the Office. The Office may,
however, consult persons that it considers may be able to assist it in its decision.20 It is not
necessary for the Office to hold a hearing.21
The Office will then examine the publication and classify it under s 23(2) as either
unrestricted, objectionable, or objectionable. The Office reports its finding to the court,22
and must publish particulars of the decision in a monthly list of decisions.23 A decision
takes effect 30 working days after the classification has been recorded in the list of
decisions, unless an application for review has been made in that time.24 Any party to the
related court proceeding may apply to the Board for a review of the decision.25 The owner,
maker, publisher, or authorised distributor of the publication also has a general right to
seek review.26 The Secretary of Internal Affairs may give leave to any other person to seek
the review of the decision.27
The review by the Board is by way of re-examination of the publication without regard
to the decision of the Office.28 The applicant for review, parties to the related proceeding,
and any other person who satisfies the Board that they are likely to be affected have a right
to make written submissions.29 The Board has the same power to consult other people who
may assist it in making its decision as the Office. The Board may also consult the Office, and
is obliged to invite the Office to make a submission if other people have made written
submissions or the Board has decided to consult any other person.30 The Board may hold a
hearing, at which people entitled to make written submissions or people consulted by the
19 Section 20(1)
2() Section 21.
21 Section 22.
22 Section 30.
23 Section 40.
24 Section 31.
25 Section 47(1)(c).
26 Section 47(1)(d).
27 Section 47(1)(e).
28 Section 52(2); The Board, in Re D. P. Women Board of Review Decision 1 /95, 2, noted that it
classifies the publication as if it had never been. classified: "fresh and unencumbered by any
knowledge of the reasons for the Classification Office's decision".
29 Section 53.
30 Section 54.
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Board have a right to be heard.31 The Board will then assign the publication one of the
classifications available under s 23(2). When the Board classifies a publication, the
previous classification of the Office is deemed to be cancelled.32 The decision of the Board
may be appealed to High Court or Court of Appeal on questions of law only.33
The classification process only allows an accused a very limited right to be heard about
a decision which has a significant effect on them. The accused may only make written
submissions to the Office or the Board. An accused does not have the opportunity to make
oral submissions unless the Board, on review, choses to hold a hearing. This is significantly
less than if the issue was decided in court. Further, parties which otherwise would not
have a right to participate in a criminal trial have the right to make submissions to the
censorship bodies, while the bodies may also choose to consult any person they wish. In
this way, conviction may be influenced by people who have no direct link to the criminal
proceeding or offence.34
D. Possible Safeguards
There are two potential safeguards or checks that may have been intended to limit how s
131 is applied.
First, a search warrant can only be obtained under the FVPCA in relation to ss 123, 124,
127 or 129.35 These offences deal broadly with the supply of objectionable publications,
exhibition to persons under 18 and public display of objectionable publications. There must
be reasonable grounds for believing that there is an objectionable publication being kept
with the purpose of being so dealt with, that there is any thing which is intended to be used
for such a purpose, or that there is any thing which is evidence of such dealing.
There is no general power to obtain a warrant for a search in relation to the possession
offence. An Inspector or member of the Police cannot seize a publication without a warrant
unless it is seized in the course of carrying out his or her lawful duties.36 Restricting the
method in which the offence can be discovered may restrict the scope of application of the
31 Section 53(3).
32 Section 55(3).
33 Sections 58 and 70.
34 See JF Kobylka The Politics of Obscenity: Group litigation in a time of legal change (Grenwood Press,
Westport, 1991) for a discussion of how the participation of interest groups, both libertarian and
proscriptionist, as amicus curiae appears to have affected the decisions of the US Supreme Court
when deciding obscenity cases.
35 Section 109.
36 Section 108.
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offence and may also prevent the possession offence being used as a tool to target certain
groups.37
Even if this is accepted, there is still scope for the discovery of the offence in the lawful
exercise of law enforcement duties. The possession offence can be discovered where a
warrant is legitimately obtained for supply reasons or other unrelated criminal offences, or
where members of the Police happen on a publication while undertaking routine tasks.
Regardless, a procedural restriction should not be seen to divert attention away from the
potential injustice of a substantive provision. If the substantive provision is unjust, it is
qualitatively no less unjust because it is applied against fewer people.
The second safeguard that may have been intended to narrow the application of the
offence is the provision of enhanced prosecutorial discretion. Leave of the Attorney-
General is required under s144 for any prosecution under the Act. If the discretion is
exercised sparingly, in cases of worst offending, and if the accused cannot be convicted of a
supply offence, the possession offence could take a residual role. This may prevent the
offence being instigated against less blameworthy people who possess, often innocently,
publications which fall within the grey area of what is objectionable.
This purported safeguard is illusory. This power may be delegated to the Commissioner
of Police in respect of offences concerning any particular class of publications.38 The
Commissioner may then delegate this power to any member of the Police, of a rank not less
than Inspector.39 In effect the provision can provide no more protection against
arbitrariness than the ordinary prosecutorial discretion. The exercise of the prosecutorial
discretion is already subject to much criticism and regarded as providing very little
protection against injustice.40
Concerns about the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion were raised in Police u
Quinla„41 in the context of censorship legislation. The defendant had been charged with the
sale of indecent publications under ss 21(1)(a) and (2) of the Indecent Publications Act 1963.
The offence was expressed as strict liability; the Police, however, could have charged the
defendant under s 22 which required that the defendant had knowledge of or reasonable
37 See H Lapsley (1993) 197 Broadsheet, who suggests that there is the "potential for using the
[FVPCA] legislation during more a repressive regime, to search for pornography in gay men's or
lesbians' houses for example, as has happened in the past."
38 Section 144(2).
39 Section 145(1).
40 See for example, A Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1991) ch 2.2.
41 Unreported, 28 February 1994, District Court at Auckland, Judge CJ Rushton.
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grounds for believing that the publication was indecent. The classification of the
publication as indecent was borderline and the Indecent Publication Tribunal noted its
concern at the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion:42
The Tribunal has considerable sympathy with the defendant's position. In this case where it
would have been extremely difficult for a defendant to have known that these unclassified
publications were indecent, it would have been more appropriate to have charged the
defendant under s 22 ... [W]e are uneasy about how appropriate it is to proceed under [s 21]
in these circumstances.
II CRITIQUE OF THE POSSESSION OFFENCE
A General Objections
1 Legislation Advisory Committee
The Legislation Advisory Committee expressed concern about the imposition of criminal
liability on a person without knowledge of or reasonable cause to believe that a
publication is objectionable. The Committee questioned the purpose of the offence and
queried how the offence would operate when blameless people were convicted:43
[H]ow is a Court ... to determine a penalty appropriate to condemn behaviour which is
blameless and to deter the recurrence of that blameless behaviour by the individual offender
and others?
The fairness of the strict liability offences was questioned, particularly in situations
where there are swift changes in public opinion or where new kinds of publications receive
consideration by the classification bodies.44 The Committee expressed unease that a person
could be liable for possession of an unclassified publication where there is no certainty
about the future determination of the Office.45
The Committee suggested that it should be a defence:46
42 Re High Times (Edition May 1993 No 213) Indecent Publications Tribunal Decision, IND 6/94,2.
43 Legislation Advisory Committee Submission on the Films, Videos, and Publications, Classification
Bill to the Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee, 24 February 1993, 1; see also
Legislation Advisory Committee Issue of Principle - Report No 8 (Wellington, 1993) 35-40.
44
Above n 43, 1.
45 Above n 43,2.
46
Above n 43,2.
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that the publication had not, at the relevant time, been considered by a classification agency,
and that there were no grounds for believing that the classification agency would find the
publication objectionable.
The Committee believed this would enhance respect for the law in this area as is would
ensure that convictions would only be possible in conjunction with fault, and accord with
the tenor of the concerns raised in the Attorney-General's report to Parliament.47
2 Indecent Publications Tribunal
The Indecent Publications Tribunal also criticised the strict liability provision and
suggested that such convictions could be extremely unfair. 48 The Tribunal said that "to
specifically remove the requirement of a 'guilty mind' violates the most fundamental principle
of the criminal law".49 It also thought the offence was unfair as it "will often depend on an
exercise of discretion by the censors based on the vague and often subjective words of clause
3:,50 The Tribunal considered that it may be impossible to predict the exercise of this
discretion, and any resulting conviction may therefore be perceived as a lottery.
3 The New Zealand Law Society
The New Zealand Law Society condemned the absence of any mental element in the
offence.5 1 The Society was concerned that a possessor may be successfully prosecuted for
possession of a publication even though they reasonably believed that the publication was
not objectionable, they had checked the register to ensure the publication was not
objectionable, and the publication had not been classified at the time of the offence.52
4 Department of Justice
The Department of Justice considered that the offence was "unnecessarily harsh.',53 The
Department considered that such a broad sweeping offence without safeguards had the
potential for substantial injustice and was out of step with other areas of the law. It also
47 Above n 43,2.
48 Indecent Publications Tribunal, Submission on the Films, Videos, and Publications, Classification
Bill to the Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee, 23 February 1993, 26.
49 Above n 48,26.
50 Above n 48,26.
51 New Zealand Law Society, Submission on the Films, Videos, and Publications, Classification Bill
to the Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee.
52 Above n 51, 2.
53 Department of Justice, Submission on the Films, Videos, and Publications, Classification Bill to
the Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee, 24 May 1993, 20.
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expressed concern that in many situations prohibited publications are close to the margin
and there can be no real certainty about the status of such publication.54 The Department
suggested that the offence might not needed to have covered all publications if the primary
goal was to prohibit child pornography or hard-core material.
B Bill of Rights
The possession offence is inconsistent with a number of the rights and freedoms
contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Although any inconsistent
legislation must prevail under s 4, the Bill of Rights provides an appropriate background for
discussing the injustice of the provision. The decision of Parliament to override these rights
and freedoms was taken, in part, on the basis of a report by the Attorney-General to
Parliament under s 7 of the Bill of Rights. The Attorney-General's report was based on a
mistaken interpretation of the Bill and the protection against retroactive penalties in the
Bill of Rights. The report was also inadequate in its consideration of the impact of the Bill
on other rights.55
1 Retroactive Penalties - Attorney-General's Report to Parliament
The Bill is one of only three government Bills the Attorney-General has reported to
Parliament under s 7 of the Bill of Rights as being inconsistent with the rights and freedoms
contained in the Bill of Rights.56 The report to Parliament focused only on the strict liability
offence of possession. The Attorney-General considered that the offence:57
...has the effect of imposing criminal liability on a person, who, at the time which the charge
relates, possessed the publication that was not then objectionable - by that, I mean
objectionable in law - in respect of which it is no defence to prove that the defendant did not
know or have reasonable cause to believe that it was objectionable.
He then advised that the section was inconsistent with s 26(1) of the Bill of Rights which
protects against retroactive penalties. This opinion was delivered on the mistaken premise
that a publication only becomes objectionable when it has been ruled by the classification
54 Above n 53,22.
55 It appears that a failure to report or incorrect reporting does not create any judicially enforceable
remedies; see Mangawaro Ente,prises Ltd v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 451 andG Huscroft
"The Attorney-General, the Bill of Rights and the Public Interest" in G Huscroft and P Rishworth
(eds). Rights and Freedoms (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 145-147.
56 Rights and Freedoms above n 55.
57 (1992) 532 NZPD 12764.
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office to be objectionable; if there was no such ruling at the time to which the prosecution
charge refers the offence operates retrospectively.58
This point was clarified by the Legislation Advisory Committee in its report on the
Bill.59 It submitted that the section does not infringe the principle of retrospectivity, despite
the determination of whether a publication is objectionable after the alleged offence. This is
60
not saying that the publication was not objectionable at the time of possession:
The offence ... looks to the objectionable character of the publication at the time Of Possession. If
there is no existing classification and the character of the publication is disputed then ... the
body making the relevant decision makes it after the event. But that is a determination of guilt
(or innocence) according to the law in force at the time of the facts constituting the alleged
offence.
The Legislation Advisory Committee report is consistent with the opinion of the Indecent
Publications Tribunal in Re High Times1 where the Tribunal considered a submission that
the previous legislation violated the Bill of Rights. The defendant had been charged with
possession for sale of an indecent document and Judge Rushton referred the question of
whether the book was indecent to the Tribunal which had exclusive jurisdiction to
determine that question.62 The Tribunal determined that handbooks on how to grow
marijuana were indecent. The Tribunal noted that although the determination of whether
the ingredients of the offence were satisfied was decided before two different bodies, the
offence was not retrospective and consistent with ordinary criminal procedure.63
2 Freedom of expression
The freedom of expression enshrined in the Bill of Rights includes the right to seek,
receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.64 The Indecent
Publications Tribunal in Re "Penthouse (US)" (Vol 19, No 5)65 considered that the freedom
58 Above n 57, 12 764.
59 Legislation Advisory Committee Issue ofPrinciple Report No 8 above n 43.
60 Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 43,37 (emphasis in original).
61 Above n 42.
62 Above n 41.
63 Re High Times above n 42,3.
64 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1910, s14. Similar protection is found in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 19(2).
65 [1991] NZAR 289.
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of expression does cover sexually explicit material.60 The Tribunal relied on the decision of
Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board ef Censors7 where the
Ontario High Court held that "all forms of expression, whether they be oral, written,
pictorial, sculpture, music, dance or film, are equally protected by the Charter.',68
This protection, however, is not absolute; section 5 of the Bill of Rights permits
justifiable limitations on the freedom of expression.69 Censorship of publications is
permissible if the censorship is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified ina free and
democratic society.70 This accords with the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme Court
in R v Butle,71 under the Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms. The Court considered
that sexual and pornographic expression is protected by the freedom of expression, but
reasonable limits on that freedom are permissible under the s 1 limitation section.
The starting point then is that the censorship regime under the FVPCA prima facie
violates the freedom of expression. The statutory regime, however, must prevail because of
section 4 of the Bill of Rights. The critical question becomes whether the interpretation and
application of the statutory discretion by the censorship bodies can be challenged. Section 6
of the Bill of Rights requires that where an enactment can be interpreted consistently with
the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights, that meaning is to be preferred. Section 5
permits reasonable limits on the protected right. Tipping J in Waverley considered that
66
Re "Penthouse (US)" above n 65, 318; it would seem to follow that publications which are not
sexually explicit but 'objectionable' for others reasons would also be covered.
67 (1983) 41 OR (2d) 583.
68 Re Ontario Film above n 73,590; this view was affirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v
Keegstra (1990) 61 CCC (3d) 1; see also Re Information Retailers Association of Metropolitan Toronto
Inc and Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1985) 52 OR (2d) 449, 468: "Non-obscene "adult books
and magazines", no matter how tasteless or tawdry they may be, are entitled to no less protection
than other forms of expression; the constitutional guarantee extends not only to that which is
pleasing, but also to that which to many may be aesthetically distasteful or morally offensive; it is
indeed often true that 'one man's vulgarity is another's lyric'."
69 Compare with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which expresses the limit
directly in article 19(3) which includes "restrictions ... necessary ..for the protection of ... public
health or morals."
70 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. Most discussion on the interface between the Bill of
Rights and censorship legislation focuses on whether a censorship decision is a reasonable limit:
see, for example, WK Hastings "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Censorship" [1990] NZLJ
384 and Re "Penthouse (US)" above n 65.
71 [1992] 1 SCR 452.
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limits imposed by the censors under the Indecent Publications Act might be justified in a free
and democratic society.72
Decisions of the censorship bodies may be susceptible to challenge under the Bill of
Rights. Where there is an ambiguity the FVPCA must be given an interpretation consistent
with the freedom of expression, under s 6. If not, the interpretation and its application is
reviewable. Where the application of the FVPCA limits the freedom of expression, but that
limit is justifiable under s 5, then its application is not reviewable. Where the statute is
clear and no interpretation is consistent with the freedom of expression then the application
of the FVPCA is not reviewable because of s 4 of the Bill of Rights.
A challenge to a decision of the censorship bodies is most likely under s 3(3) where a
censor exercises a very broad discretion. There is less scope for challenging decisions of the
bodies in applying s 3(2) of the FVPCA, as this section deems certain things to be
objectionable. The subsection is not discretionary and is an inconsistent limit imposed
directly by Parliament through statute, which cannot be challenged because of s 4 of the Bill
of Rights.73
Although a decision to ban a publication may be a justified limitation, the inclusion of
the possession offence may not. The imposition of criminal liability without any
requirement that a person know the publication is objectionable will have a chilling effect
on the freedom of expression. Rishworth noted that the Attorney-General could have
reported this inconsistency to Parliament: 74
The Attorney-General could have reported that the strict liability offence was inconsistent
with the guarantee of freedom of expression, in that it would result in self-censorship beyond
that which was necessary to comply with the law, in order to avoid committing an offence
based on a mistake as to the boundaries of 'objectionable' publications.
Undoubtedly any rigid boundary that defines illegality creates a chilling effect because
people are reluctant to publish or possess items in the grey area around this boundary. The
FVPCA, however, exacerbates this chilling effect in two main ways. First, the position of
the boundary is unclear because of the vague or nebulous definition of objectionable. It is
extremely difficult to predict how the criteria will be applied in particular situations.
72 Society for the Promotion of Community Standards Inc v Waverley International (1988) Ltd [1993] 2
NZLR 709,727 (under Indecent Publications Act 1963). The Board accepts that limits imposed
by decisions of the Office and Board are prescribed by law: see Re D P Women above n 28.
73 There is some scope for arguing that ambiguities exist in the meanings of the prohibited activities
and whether a publication 'tends to promote or support' these activii ies and that, accordingly, a
similar s 6 argument is still available.
74 Rights and Freedoms above n 55, 167 footnote 55.
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Secondly, the absence of a no-fault defence means people will be compelled to dispose of any
publication anywhere near the boundary because if they are charged with the possession
offence they will not able to argue that they possessed the publication in good faith.
Dugdale illustrates the point effectively:75
So to avoid the risk of committing a criminal offence under this section a New Zealander must
burn any book in his or her possession that might strike the Classification Office or the Film and
Literature Boards of Review as objectionable. To hell with that.
3 Presumption Of Innocence
The presumption of innocence is guaranteed by s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights.76 The
doctrine is regarded as one of the central pillars of the criminal justice system, although it is
essentially a product of the oommon law.77 The House of Lords in Woolmington v DPF8
said that it was the "one golden thread" of the criminal law.79 The New Zealand Court of
Appeal in R v RangP acknowledged that s 25(c) reflects the "basic principle of criminal
law [that] the onus of proof remains throughout on the Crown.„81
The presumption of innocence is, more precisely, a compendium of several legal
principles. The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Oakes82 considered the nature of the right
under the Canadian Charter.83 It decided the hlinimum content' of the right was that an
individual must be proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, that the State must bear the
burden of proof, and that criminal prosecutions must be carried out in accordance with
lawful procedures and fairness. In addition, the Court in other cases has indicated the right
requires that the elements necessary to constitute an offence in law ought to be sufficient to
constitute moral guilt.84
75 Above n 62, 17.
76 A similar provision is found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 14(2).
77 Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Imu (Brooker's, Wellington, 1992) Ch10.16.01.
78 [1935] AC 462.
79 Woolmington, above n 78,481.
80 [19921 1 NZLR 385,
81 Above n 80,389.
82 (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200; 24 CCC (3d) 321.
83 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 11(d).
84 R u Sault Ste Marie (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161; R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc (1991) 84 DLR (4th) 161.
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An offence of absolute liability or strict liability85 prima facie abridges the presumption
of innocence because a person is convicted without proof of any fault element which, on
general criminal law principles, would be required for a finding of guilt. The critical issue
is whether this is a reasonable limit on the presumption of innocence. The Canadian
Supreme Court in Reference re s 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle AcM held absolute liability
could not be a reasonable limit except in exceptional conditions like natural disasters or
war.87 In general it is difficult to see any limit imposed by absolute liability on the
presumption of innocence can be reasonable when a reverse-onus offence is a less intrusive
or more proportionate way of achieving the objective of easing the Crown's burden of
proof. 88
The status of the reverse-onus offence under the Bill of Rights is less clear. The reverse-
onus offence describes an offence with no express fault element which appears on its face to
be absolute liability, but where the courts imply a defence of absence of fault into the
offence. 89 Therefore on proof of the actus reus, guilt is presumed unless the defendant
proves, on the balance of probabilities, an absence of fault.
In Wholesale Travel Group: the Canadian Supreme Court was divided over whether a
reverse-onus offence could be successfully challenged under the Charter. Two judges
decided the reverse-onus offence did not prima facie breach the presumption of innocence,1
85 In this article, strict liability is used to describe an offence which does not allow a defence of lack
of fault. This is consistent with its use in the FVPCA. Absolute liability is the more familiar term
for an offence with excludes proof of fault. Strict liability, however, is often used to describe
offences, like those in Civil Aviation Department v McKenzie [1983] NZLR 78 and Sault Ste Marie
above n 84, where proof of the actus reus prima facie imports guilt unless the defendant can
exonerate herself by proving an absence of fault. To avoid confusion, these offences are referred
to as 'reverse-onus' offences, rather than strict liability.
86
[1985] 2 SCR 486.
87
Reference re s 94(2) above n 86, 518.
88
Proportionality or the existence of a less intrusive alternative is critical to whether a decision is a
justified limitation, Oakes above n 82; adopted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Ministry
of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260. The Ontario Court of Appeal used a similar approach
when they rejected absolute liability in favour of the reverse-onus offence in Metro News Ltd
(1986) 29 CCC (3d) 35, although the issue arose in the context of fundamental justice not under
the presumption of innocence.
89 MacKenzie above n 85; Sault Ste Marie above n 84. The Court in MacKenzie drew a distinction
between true crimes and public welfare regulatory offences; there is a presumption that silent
offences which are truly criminal require the Crown to prove mens rea, while it is permissible
with public welfare regulatory offerlces to require the defendant to bear the burden of proof.
90 R v Wholesale Travel [1991] 3 SCR 1521.
91 Cory and L'Heureux-Dubd JJ.
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three judges decided that it prima facie breached the presumption of innocence but was a
reasonable limit,92 while the remaining four judges concluded that it prima facie infringed the
right and could not be saved under the limitation section73 The ultimate result was that
reverse-onus regulatory offences are permissible under the Charter. The same result
appears likely under the New Zealand Bill of Rights.
The possession offence in the FVPCA limits the presumption of innocence as it provides
for guilt irrespective of the accused's state of mind. As noted in Adams on Criminal Law:94
"Guilt is therefore possible despite 'moral' innocence." The no-defence provision cannot
been seen to be a justifiable limit because a reverse-onus offence provides a more
proportionate response to enforcement in this area, in that it adequately alleviates any
difficulty in proof for the Crown, but still requires some element of moral culpability.
C Criminal Law Criticisms of Strict or Absolute Liability
Strict or absolute liability is criticised as a tool in criminal law on two grounds: it is
unjust and it is ineffective. An appropriate starting point is Packer, who is one of the
strongest critics of strict liability:95
To punish conduct without reference to the actor's state of mind is both inefficacious and
unjust. It is inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by awareness of the factors
making it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs to be subjected to punishment in
order to deter him or others from behaving similarly in the future, nor does it single him out as
a socially dangerous individual who needs to be incapacitated or reformed. It is unjust
because the actor is subjected to the stigma of a criminal conviction without being morally
blameworthy.
The deterrence aspect of punishment will not be effective unless a person is aware of the
factors which make the offending wrong. It is impossible to deter people who are acting
under a mistaken factual belief that their conduct complies with the law. People should not
be marked as requiring punishment or reform because they are mistaken as to the facts of
their offending. Moral blameworthiness is taken to mean knowledge that what one is doing
is wrong but choosing to continue that conduct:6
92 Iacobucci, Gonthier and Stevenson JJ·
93 Lamer CJC, La Forest, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ·
94 Adams above n 77, Ch 10.16.05.
95 HL Packer "Mens Rea and the Supreme Court" (1962) Sup Ct Rev 107, 109.
96 This paper does not wish to challenge the validity of the appropriate threshold of censorship
generally. The analysis in this paper accepts that those publications which are objectionable
under s 3 are correctly prohibited. Publications which are not prohibited, however, are seen as
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The classic subjective approach of requiring mens rea and rejecting the use of absolute or
strict liability is the dominant thinking in criminal law jurisprudence. One of the leading
writers, Hart, strongly asserts the value of punishment rests on the fundamental tenet of
subjective responsibility, that "unless a [person] has the capacity and a fair opportunity or
chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties should not be applied."97 The no-
defence provision in the FVPCA is directly in conflict with this. The strict liability
possession offence may punish people who have no opportunity to comply with the law
because they are not aware of the contents of a publication, or do not know that a
publication is considered to be objectionable.
D Inconsistency with Application of Similar Provisions in the Criminal Law
The Draconian nature of the strict liability clause can be illustrated by examining
similar offences, both in New Zealand and overseas, where the courts have interpreted
offences according to generally accepted criminal principles, fundamental justice, and the
basic protections contained in Bills of Rights. The disparity between the approach adopted
by the courts and the approach dictated by Parliament through the no-defence provision
demonstrates the severity of such a provision and the degree to which it departs from
accepted understandings of fairness in criminal law.
1 Mens rea should apply to all elements Of the actus reus
The notion of 'possession' at law has clearly developed to include knowledge of the
characteristics of restricted object. The approach is consistent will the general theory if
mens rea is required for an offence it should be applied to all elements of the actus reus.98
If the general approach is applied to possession of objectionable materials, then the actus
reus of the offence can be separated into two limbs: the first is possession of a thing; the
second is that the thing is an objectionable publication. The Crown must prove that the
accused had mens rea toward the first limb of possession." Secondly, the mens rea must also
apply to fact that the publication is objectionable. The difficulty is that the second limb of
the possession offence, that a publication is objectionable, is more like a question of law
than a question of fact.100 The no-defence provision in the FVPCA, however, does not
require proof of the mens rea with respect to the second limb.
legal, legitimate, and morally acceptable.
97
HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968) 81.
98 R v Howe [1982] NZLR 619; Police v Wanika [1987] NZLR 753.
99 Mens rea is generally regarded to include intention, knowledge, and reckless (knowingly taking
an unreasonable risk).
100
See discussion below part IV F.
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The possession of drugs offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 provide a similar
situation to obscenity offences - where the physical and metal components are more
itemised because possession is a state of affairs. Mathias notes that the courts require not
only knowledge about possession but also a complex state of mind called 'guilty knowledge'.
If a defendant does not know a drug is prohibited, it must be shown that they know the
characteristics of the drug, plant, or seed.101
A similar approach with obscenity offences would require for a conviction that a
defendant also did not know that a publication was prohibited, at least had knowledge of
the content of the magazine which lead to its prohibition, that is, knowledge that it depicts
necrophilia or dehumanises women.
E Inconsistency with Application of Other Obscenity Offences
1 New Zealand under previous regimes -Rv Ewart
The defendant in R v Ewart102 had been charged under s 3 of the Offensive Publications
Act 1892 for selling written matter which was indecent, immoral, or obscene. The Court of
Appeal considered whether the offence required the Crown prove only that the defendant
was selling a newspaper which was indecent, or whether the Crown also had to prove that
the defendant knew or had reason to know the contents of the newspaper before he could be
found guilty. The majority concluded that the commission of the act of selling prima facie
meant that an offence had been committed, but that that could be rebutted by the defendant if
he could prove the absence of a guilty mind.103
This case is regarded as the seminal case in New Zealand on the judicial classification of
offences which are silent as to any mens rea requirement. The decision is the precursor to
the reverse-onus category which has been widely accepted since Sault Ste Marie and
Mackenzie.104 Ewart has also been frequently cited in overseas jurisdictions with approval
in decisions which insisted on mens rea or some form of scienter in respect of the obscenity
element of offences.
105
101
D Mathias "Guilty Knowledge About Drugs" [1991] NZLJ 280.
102 (1905) 25 NZLR 709.
103 Ewart, above n 102, 737, Edwards, Williams and Chapman JJ; Stout CJ and Cooper J dissenting.
104 See discussion of reverse-onus offences in text at n 84.
105 For example: Smith v Cal¢ornia 361 US 147 (1959); Metro News Ltd above n 88; R v Wampfler (1987)
11 NSWLR 541. 'Scienter' refers to the degree of knowledge that a publication is obscene or
objectionable.
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The later decision of Fraser v Beckett and Sterling Ltd106 appears anomalous to the
approach in Ewart. The Court of Appeal was required to consider the appropriate fault
requirement in s 46 of the Customs Act 1913 which prohibited the importation of indecent
document. The majority concluded that the offence was absolute liability and mens rea was
not required to whether the document was indecent.107 The majority indicated that there is a
strong presumption is favour of mers rea. The courts are however, obliged to impose
absolute liability, though, if it is the clear and plain intention of Parliament to impose
absolute liability. The presumption of mens rea could not apply in Fraser because several
factors indicated Parliament's clear intention that the offence was absolute liability,
including the fact that an identical offence expressly required knowledge, and conviction
was required before the illegal goods could be confiscated.
2 Comparative analysis
(i) Canada
The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Jorgensen108 recently considered the scope of the
knowledge requirement for sale of obscene materials. The defendant was charged with
knowingly selling obscene materials after three video tapes depicting explicit consensual
sex were purchased from his Adults-Only video store.109 The video tapes were determined
to be obscene at trial because of the combination of sex and violence.
110
The Court held that the Crown must show not only that the accused was aware that the
material had as it dominant characteristic the exploitation of sex, but also that the accused
knew of the specific characteristics which make the material obscene in law.111 Sopinka J
demonstrated the application of this rule:112
If, for example, the offensive part of the video was that which showed a male spanking the
female and forcing her to have sexual relations, then ... it must be shown that the retailer was
106 [1963] NZLR 480.
107 Above n 106, North and McCarthy JJ, Gresson P dissenting.
108 [1995] 4 SCR 55.
109 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s 163(2): "knowingly ... sells exposes to public view or has in his
possession for such a purpose any obscene ... thing whatever."
110 Jorgensen above n 108, 105. The specific reasons for each determination were: Bung Ho Babes:
"[equates] sex and punishment in the context of subordination"; Made in Hollywood: "coupled sex
and violence"; and Dr Butts: "the woman is coerced into sexual relations and that the violence
and her position of subordination are legitimized".
111
Jorgensen above n 108, 106.
112
Jorgensen above n 108, 106.
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aware or wilfully blind that the video being sold contained this scene. There may of course be
cases where the obscenity results for the overall character of the film. This may occur where a
video portrays women in positions of subordination, servile submission or humiliation without
any verbalisation or other express reference to this depiction as a theme in itself. ... In such
instances, if the court is unable to specify any particular scene but still concludes that, overall,
the film is obscene in law, then it only makes sense that sufficient proof be offered to show
that the retailer was aware of the 'overall' obscene nature of the film.
The Court did, however, note that this does not extend to proof the accused knew that
the materials were obscene in law because ignorance of the law is no excuse. Thus if an
accused viewed the videos and observed the spanking or noticed the underlying degradation
but thought that it was harmless and inoffensive, then he would be guilty. 113 Sopinka J also
noted that knowledge did not have to be obtained by viewing the videos and that the
blameworthy state of mind could be inferred without proving that the defendant actually
viewed the videos, by proof for instance of surreptitious behaviour by the defendant Or
warnings and directions from external enforcement agencies.114 Equally, the Court
considered that a person who is wilfully blind to the contents satisfied the knowledge
requirement because a suspicion, which the person deliberately omits to turn into certain
knowledge, requires some degree of initial knowledge.115
The Supreme Court also approved the decision in R v Metro News Ltdl 16 that an absolute
liability offence of distributing obscene matter was unconstitutional.117 -Ux Metro News Ltd
the offence expressly provided that it was no defence that the accused was ignorant of the
presence or nature of the thing that was obscene. The Court said that provision was a
prima facie breach of the Charter as it infringed right to fundamental justice contained in s 7.
It held that this infringement could not be justified under s 1 of the Charter because it impairs
the right more than is necessary to achieve the objective of easing the Crown's difficulty in
proving guilt, and accordingly struck the provision down as constitutionally invalid.118
The Court recognised there was a substantial argument that such a provision also violated
113
Jorgensen above n 108, 107.
114
Jorgensen above n 108, 108.
115 Iorgensen above n 108, 110.
116 Above n 88.
117
Jorgensen above n 108, 95.
118 Metro News Ltd above n 88,53. The Court noted that the objective of the no-defence provision
was "relieving the Crown of the burden of proof with respect to guilty knowledge on charges of
distributing obscene matter because of the alleged difficulty or virtual impossibility in the
circumstances of discharging that burden."
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the freedom of expression contained in s 2(b) of the Charter, but did not find it necessary to
decide whether the provision was constitutionally invalid on that basis.119
As the Court had struck down the no-defence provision, the Court considered what
category of fault should be implied into the offence. It rejected the idea that mens rea of the
obscene matter was required and decided instead that the act of distribution prima facie
imported the offence, but the accused could avoid criminal liability by showing that he had
acted under an honest and reasonable mistake of fact.120 The possibility of mistake of fact
was limited to the presence and character of the matter alleged to be obscene and not to the
obscenity test of whether the matter exceeds community standards of tolerance. The Court
considered that relieving the Crown of the burden of proving mens rea in this manner did not
offend the right to fundamental justice and the presumption of innocence contained in ss 7
and 11(d) of the Charter.121
(ii) United States
The United States Supreme Court in Smith v California,22 held that a statute that imposed
123
The lowerabsolute liability for the possession of obscene books was unconstitutional.
courts had convicted a bookstore owner of possession of a book that was later determined
to be obscene. The offence included no knowledge element. The bookseller was liable even
though he may have had no knowledge of the contents or character of the books.
The Court was unanimous that the absence of a scienter element violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendrrent.124 The Court reasoned that, although obscene speech
and writings are not constitutionally protected,125 the absolute liability provision created a
chilling effect that would limit non-obscene expression:126
119 Metro News Ltd above n 88,54.
120 Metro News Ltd above n 88,63. For true crimes the accused need only raise a reasonable doubt
that in the absence of a guilty mind because of this mistake.
121 Metro News Ltd above n 88,62.
122 361 US 147 (1959).
123 Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles, §41.01.1; the appellant was charged with possession
of an obscene or indecent writing or book in any place of business where books are sold or kept
for sale.
124 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from infringing the First Amendment: Smith above
n 122, 149.
125 Roth v United States 354 US 476 (1957).
126 Smith above n 122, 153.
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The bookseller's limitation in the amount of reading material with which he could familiarise
himself, and his timidity in the face of his absolute criminal liability, thus would tend to restrict
the public's access to forms of the printed word which the State could not constitutionally
suppress directly. The bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a
censorship affecting the whole public ... [T]he distribution of all books, both obscene and not
obscene, would be impeded.
Accordingly the provision was struck down as being unconstitutional. It was not
necessary for the Court to decide the appropriate level of scienter, although it noted that
options included full mens rea, subjective or objective recklessness, and allowing a defence
of honest mistake. 127
In the later case of Hamling u United States,128 the Supreme Court considered it was
constitutionally sufficient to require proof of knowledge of the contents of the materials and
knowledge of the character and nature of the materials.129 The Court was unwilling to
insist on proof of a defendant's knowledge of the actual legal status of the materials as this
would allow a defendant to avoid prosecution by "simply claiming that he had not brushed
up on the law".
130
Similarly in United States v X-Citement Vide0131 the Supreme Court decided that with an
offence of transportation of child pornography, the knowledge requirement "extends both to
the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age of the performers.
„132
(iii) Australia
In R v Wampfler133 the defendant was charged with publishing an indecent article.134
The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that an offence, which was silent as to
any mens rea element, allowed a defence of honest and reasonable mistake in innocence.
Street CJ considered that Ewart135 was directly applicable, because the New Zealand
127
Smith above n 122, 154.
128
418 US 87 (1974).
129
Hamling above n 128, 123.
130
Hamling above n 128, 123.
131 (1994) 130 L Ed (2d) 372.
132
Above n 131, 385
133
C M V Clarkson and H M Keating Criminal Law: Text and Materials (3 ed Sweet and Maxwell,
London, 1994) 199.
134
Indecent Articles and Classified Publications Act 1975, s6(1).
135 Above n 102.
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legislation was informed by the same policy considerations as the New South Wales
136
legislation in the case.
(iv) England
The House of Lords took a different approach from other jurisdictions when it
approved the imposition of strict liability in a criminal action for blasphemous libel. In R v
Lemon,137 Gay News had published a poem and drawings describing and depicting acts of
sodomy and fellatio on a crucified body of Christ. The defendant had claimed that although
he had knowingly published the poem and drawings, he had no mens rea as to its
blasphemous nature.
The majority held that it was sufficient the Crown prove that the accused intended to
publish the magazine and that mens rea was not required with respect to whether the
magazine was a blasphemous libel.138 It has been suggested the majority implicitly applied
the approach advocated by Baroness Wootton, that the justification for absolute liability is
the existence of harm, regardless of the moral culpability of the accused.139
The minority strongly dissented despite their personal outrage at the material.140 Their
Lordships said the offence also required proof that the accused had intended the
blasphemous libel, that is, the accused had intended to produce shock and arouse resentment
among believing Christians. Lord Diplock said that classifying the offence as absolute
liability was "a retrograde step which could not be justified by any considerations of public
policy.
„141
The classification of this offence appeared difficult for the House of Lords. Even Lord
Scarman accepted that the arguments of the minority had "great persuasive force".142 This
was the first time the House of Lords was required to classify an offence of this nature.
Furthermore, their Lordships only had two discrete options, either mens rea was required
towards the blasphemous libel element or the offence was absolute liability; the
intermediate reverse-onus category had not been accepted at that time. The majority opinion
136 Wampfler above n 133, 548.
137 [1979] AC 617.
138 Lord Russell, Lord Scarman and Viscount Dilhorne.
139 Above n 133, 103, 104.
140 Lord Diplock and Lord Edmund-Davies.
141 R v Lemon above n 137, 638.
142 R v Lemon above n 137, 664.
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has been strongly criticised by commentators. 143 The failure of the House of Lords to
consider the intermediate possibility of reverse-onus offence and the fact that the result is at
odds with all other jurisdictions means the English position is of limited persuasive value.
3 Summary - what do all these cases mean?
The authorities from overseas and New Zealand prior to the express no-defence
provision, emphasise an insistence on some proof of culpability towards whether an item is
objectionable, indecent or obscene. Absolute liability in this context places an unjustifiable
limit on rights protected by constitutional documents. England is alone in allowing absolute
liability for obscene publications, although the decision was controversial.
The courts have recognised the problems of proof for the Crown if it has to prove a mers
rea, but have overcome this by classifying silent offences as reverse-onus offences. That is,
guilt is prima facie imported on possession but the defendant can exonerate herself by
proving a mistake of fact or lack of a guilty mind. If mens rea is required, however, proof is
required of mens rea towards the essential characteristic that makes a publication obscene.
The courts are clear, though, that they will not allow mistakes as to law. Defences such as
mistake or no reasonable grounds for belief may only be applied to the contents of a
publication, not to whether it is obscene or indecent. The corollary of this is that a
successful defence under a reverse-onus offence can be asserted not only where the
defendant is mistaken to the general nature of a publication, but also where she is mistaken
as to the specific characteristic which makes it objectionable.
In the absence of s 131(3) these authorities would allow at least a defence of mistake of
fact or lack of reasonable grounds for belief. The characteristic of which the defendant
could be mistaken could include any of the listed activities in s 3(2) that deem a publication
objectionable under that subsection, or the factor or factors under s 3(3) that operate to
make a publication objectionable. A mistake as to the general test under s 3(1) of whether
the availability of a publication is likely to be injurious to the public good would not excuse
the defendant because this is a mistake of law. If alternatively mens rea is required then the
Crown would need to prove that the defendant knew, was reckless or wilfully blind to all
of those characteristics.
F Mistake of Fact, Value Iudgment, or Mistake of Law?
One of the difficulties with applying the rule against mistake of law is that there is much
less certainty with the law in censorship than with other areas. Mistake of law is easily
applicable to murder, traffic regulations, or whether a particular drug is prohibited because
143
See for example JC Smith "Case and Comment: R v Lemon and Another" [1979] Crim LR 312.
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there is no doubt about the law. Doubt, however, is inherent in the definition of
objectionable.
The rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse is based on the presumption that
everyone knows the law. The justification for not permitting a defence of ignorance is
founded on four key points: it would involve the courts in insurmountable evidential
problems; it would encourage ignorance where knowledge is socially desirable; people
would be laws unto themselves, infringing the principle of legality and contradicting the
moral principles underlying the law; and ignorance of the law is blameworthy in itself.144
The rationale for the rule generally is not wholly convincing:145 the evidential problems are
not more difficult than those faced with proving mens rea; the rule ignores the circumstances
of and difficulties in achieving knowledge of the law; a individual defence of ignorance of
the law does not erode the principle of legality or that it is for the courts to determine what
the law is; and blame for ignorance should not import blame and punishment for greater
offences.
The courts are beginning to depart slightly from the rule. Some jurisdictions have begun
operating a general defence of reasonable mistake of law on similar terms to mistake of
fact.146 Other jurisdictions have allowed a defence of mistake of law where it is impossible
for a person to know the law. The development of this exception has been rather ad hoc and
confined to situations where the law has not been published or is otherwise not
accessible.
147
It is arguable by analogy that a where the law is so unclear that it is intelligible, a
person should not be convicted under such a law, because it is impossible for her to comply
with it. Fuller asserts that where a statute or the application of a statute lacks clarity it
should not be enforced by the courts.148 He regards clarity in the law as "one of the most
essential ingredients of legality".149 He argues that if there is a duty of citizens to obey the
law, then there is a corresponding duty that the legislature make the law clear and
understandable; if it is not, then the legislature has failed to make a law.150 Vaughan CJ in
144
D Stuart Canadian Criminal Law (2 ed, Carswell Company Ltd, Toronto, 1983 274.
145
See Stuart above n 144, 273-278 for an extensive critique of the rationale for the rule.
146 South Africa: De Blom (1977) 3 SA 313; Germany: Penal Code of Federal Republic of Germany §
17; see G Fletcher Rethinking the Criminal Law (Little & Brown, Boston, 1978) 749.
147
Re Michelin Tires Maufacturing (Canada) Ltd (1975) 15 NSR (2d) 150, R v Ross (1944) 84 CCC 107,
Burns v Nowell (1880) 5 QBD 444, Lim Chin Aik v R [1963] AC 160.
148 LL Fuller The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964) 63.
149 Fuller above n 148, 63.
150 Fuller above n 148, 43.
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Thomas v Sorrell151 said that "a law which a Inan cannot obey, nor act according to it, is
void and no law: and it is impossible to obey contradictions, or act according to them."
The difficulty with asserting that mistake of law is no excuse in the FVPCA is that the
law lacks clarity. Although the legislature has provided an extensive definition of what is
objectionable, the operation of the determination is unpredictable.152 Even if a person is
fully aware of the contents of a publication and of the statutory definition, their desire to
comply with the law may be thwarted because of this lack of clarity. The accused may still
be convicted despite making no mistake as to the law and taking all steps to comply with it.
Glanville Williams regarded questions, such as whether a publication is objectionable,
as value-judgments which are intermediate between questions of fact and questions of
law.153 He recognised that on current law defendants' failure to foresee the decision of the
court or tribunal does not excuse them Williams had no problem with this value-judgment
when it concerns whether something is reasonable as the approach is accepted and
predictable, but he wrote that serious problems arise with the nebulous nature of the
obscenity question because the value-judgment becomes highly speculative.154 The exercise
of the value-judgment by the Office and Board confirm these concerns, as the overall pool of
decisions show a disturbing lack of consistency and predicability.
G Vagueness in DejiniNon and Inconsistency in Application
1 Meaning Of'tends to promote or support' is unclear
The Board of Review in New Truth considered the phrase 'tends to promote or support'
in the context of whether a newspaper tends to promote or support the contents of an
advertisement promoting prohibited activities.155 The Board mentioned synonyms such as
'encourage', 'support actively', 'publicise and sell', 'speak in favour of' and be actively
interested in'. A publication that publishes and sells a service contained in an
advertisement clearly supports that service. The very nature of advertisements are to
promote or sell those activities and, because the editor has the choice of whether to accept
151 (1673) Vaug 333.
152
It is disappointing that the decisions of the Office and Board are not reported in widely available
law reports and this failure exacerbates the difficulty of citizens knowing and predicting the
censorship law.
153 G Williams Textbook on Criminal Law (2 ed Stevens & Sons, London, 1983) 141; These are
sometimes referred to 'mixed fact and law' questions: E Colvin Pn*nciples of Cnminal Law (2 ed,
Carswell, Toronto, 1991) 165; Thomas v R (1937) 59 CLR 279.
154
G Williams, above n 153, 145.
155 New Truth above n 5.
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the advertisement or not, a publication containing those advertisements also tends to
156
promote or support those activities.
The High Court, however, removed any subjective element. It suggested that the approach
is fully objective, and does not need reference to a publisher's state of mind.157
It is unclear how this test is to be applied to other situations, particularly in the like of
the different approaches suggested by different censors. For example the Classification
Office decided that the Mapplethorpe collection did not tend to promote the use of urine in
association with sexual conduct, or sadomasochism, despite graphic and positive depictions
of such activity. The Office said that "it is the art of Mapplethorpe that is being supported,
rather that the [prohibited activity]".158 Stanish ponders whether "a book about a charming
erudite, and much loved politician who is also a necrophiliac" might be regarded a s
promoting or supporting necrophilia because it presents an unworthy character or activity
in a favourable light.159 Was the film Romper-Stomper promoting or supporting the brutal
activities in the film by presenting the leader of the Nazi-worshipping street gang as a
charismatic and engaging leader2160 Does Metro Magazine promote or support criminal
activity by including heroine addiction in the month's list of what is 'hot'161
The Indecent Publications Tribunal described the words as a "wild card" that could be
used to ban publications such at Lolita, Lost Exit to Brooklyn, Hitler's Mein Kampf American
Psycho, and Male Mal(ficaruium, the handbook of the Spanish Inquisition, despite these
publications having accepted merit.162 The Tribunal also suggested that it could prohibit
scholarly discussion of unpleasant topics, such Urban Aboriginals which was an account of
the psychological and sociological explanations and effects of sadomasochistic practices.
163
The Department of Justice is correct in noting that a "publication does not have to expressly
advocate" an activity in order to tend to promote or support it, but it is difficult to agree
156 New Truth above n 5, 15.
157 News Media, above n 5, 175.
158 Jim & Tom, Sausalito, 1977 OFLC Ref 9501765.
159 G Stanish "The Films Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993" (1994) AULR 719, 722.
160 Above n 159, 722.
161 Metro Magazine, Auckland, New Zealand, September 1996, 36; this question though does not
arise under s 3(2) because promoting criminal activity is not a prohibited activity, but is instead
considered under s 3(3)(d).
162 Above n 48, 11.
163 Above n 48, 12.
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with its belief that "serious works of literature and drama, documentary material and
professional publications" would necessarily stand outside that definition.164
The phrase 'promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support' still appears
equivocal and brings a lack of clarity to the operation of the automatic deeming provisions.
2 Inconsistent application by Omce
A survey of the decisions of the Office over the past two years shows a disturbing lack
of consistency. This blurs the border-line between publications which are objectionable
and those which are not, and exacerbates the injustice of the possession offence by making it
almost impossible to predict a classification.
The magazine Open Door 17,165 which presented explicit images of women engaged in
sexual activity with meri, was determined to be objectionable under s 3(3) of the FVPCA.
The publication degraded, dehumanised, and demeaned women by presenting graphic
displays of women's vaginas, and images of women being penetrated and ejaculated over.
Magazines of similar content and nature, however, have received different classifications.
For example Expose,166 was determined to be objectionable except if restricted to persons
over 18,167 while Ribald No 404168 was determined to be objectionable unless its availability
was restricted to the owner. The use of the restricted classification also makes the
objectionable question ambiguous. Some of the decisions have classified publications a s
objectionable unless restricted to a particular event or person. Examples include movies
restricted to a gay and lesbian film festival,169 video documentary with frank depictions of
sadomasochism but of a personal nature restricted to the importer,17o a personal letter
depicting cruel sadomasochistic images of women restricted to the owner,171 and a magazine
depicting explicit sexual material that degrades women restricted to the owner as part of a
164
Above n 53,8.
165
OFLC Ref 9400983; See similar decisions: Sexasianall No 2 OFLR Ref 9400987.
166 OFLC Ref 9400982.
167
The effect of this classification is to exclude the publication from the ambit of the possession
offence; offences of supply and display of restricted publications are covered by ss 126, 127 and
130.
168 OFLC Ref 9400514.
169
Hustler White, OFLC Ref 9600476, Blood Sisters, OFLC Ref 9600588, and Bittersweet, OFLC Ref
9600591.
170
From Wimps to Warriors, OFLC Ref 21.
171 Letter "Dear Slave Sue" OFLC Ref 9500355.
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large personal collection.172 The difficulty caused by classifying similar publications
differently is that decisions merely restricting publications may provide a person with a
legitimate belief that such a publication is not objectionable. An example of this is where a
person views a restricted movie at a film festival. The fact that a publication is restricted to
an event or publication is not always obvious. From this a person can sensibly fonn the
opinion that the movie is being shown with the approval of the censorship bodies and that
similar such movies are not objectionable. If charged for possession of similar movies,
however, that person cannot assert this rational justification for the possession.
The classification of publications that deal with sexual violence or the infliction of pain
has also blurred the border-line of what is objectionable. Many publications were
determined to be objectionable because of the sadomasochistic nature of the publications or
the use of violence in a sexual context.173 Similar publications, however, received only a
restricted classification: sadomasochistic activity is contrived and consent is clear,174
sadomasochistic paraphernalia only presented for effect, 175 high-depictions of infliction of
serious physical harm upon a male's genitals acceptable, 176 and depiction of vaginal fisting
presented in a 'gentle manner'.177 Again these classifications provide the public with little
consistency with which to predict the potential classification of a publication.
There is a particular problem with the interpretation of the clause relating to
exploitation of children or young persons under s 3(2)(a). This provision is being applied
very liberally to ban short stories that describe a woman seducing a 16 year old boy,178
stories that state that a male participant is 18 but is referred to as 'boy' and coerced into
sex,179 video slicks that depict youthful-looking males,180 videos showing two teenage boys
of slight physiques engaged in self and mutual masturbation,181 publications depicting
consensual heterosexual teenage sex,182 and publications of females portrayed as youthful
172 Ribald above n 168.
173 See for example Bondage Landlord, OFLC Ref 874, Oged Fury, OFLC Ref: 9502174.
174
Bizarre Fetish and Fantasy Issue #4, OFLC Ref 9400567.
175
Die Rujung OFLC Ref 9400952.
176 Atlars (Mapplethorpe) OFLC Ref 9501800.
177
Hot Afternoon OFLC Ref 9500671.
178 The Mother Loves to Fuck: AST00040.TXL OFLC Ref 9500947.
179 Honcho October 1995, OFLC Ref 9600250.
180
Gero Gay Extra 9 Handmerker Burcher, OFLR Ref 9501543.
181
Golden Boys Video 36, OFLC Ref 9501092.
, 182 Screening Purpose Only, OFLC Ref 9501152.
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because they have pig-tails .183 A CD-ROM that depicted young models, however, was not
considered objectionable.184 It is also significant that the Board decided in New Truth that
advertisements for sexual services that used phrases like 'school girl or boy', 'student' or
'students/virgins' tended to promote the exploitation of young persons regardless of
whether an age is contained in the advertisement.185 Personal advertisements of 16 year old
boys were also regarded as exploitative and objectionable.186 These determinations make it
impossible to rely on the age of the model in predicting whether a publication is
objectionable and demonstrate that the threshold for exploitation of young persons is more
complex than the legislation indicates on its face.
The decision of the office to prohibit advertising hoardings on Karangahape Rd which
depicted cartoon paintings of women was controversial and unexpected, although it was
later overturned by the Board.187 The signs were considered to be part of the social and
cultural background of the area but the signs were banned because some people were
offended by and concerned about the signs. Decisions like this illustrate the difficulty in
predicting how the s 3 criteria will be applied by the censorship bodies.
3 Disparity between decisions of the Ofice and Board
Predicability is also reduced by the current disagreement over interpretation of s 3
between the Office and the Board. In the fifteen decisions that have been issued by the
Board a different classification has resulted on 12 occasions. The disagreement in approach
appears to be over the operation of the s 3(2) automatic deeming provision,188 and the
, 189
consideration of what activities are 'degrading, dehumanising, and demeaning.
Given that the censorship bodies cannot reach agreement about what is objectionable, it
is most unfair to expect the public to predict accurately the appropriate classification.190
183
Sweet Chick 7, OFLC Ref 9400816.
184
Hot Hungable Hunks, OFLC Ref 9501273.
185 New Truth above n 5, 15. See also Rovers (Vol 1 Nos. 1,2, 3 and 4) Board of Review Decision 6/96.
186 The Office and the Board appears to have interpreted children or young persons to mean
persons under 18. Arguably, the age of 16 would have been a more appropriate threshold as this
would be consistent with the criminal laws which relate to the age at which a person may
consent.
187 For example "The Vegas Girl" Sign on Karangahape Road OFLC Ref 9600068; "Vegas Girl" billboard
Board of Review Decision 1 /97.
188 See New Truth above n 5.
189 See for example Australian Penthouse Hot Shots No 1 Board of Review Decision 2/95.
190 A person can be convicted of an offence even where she relies on the decision of one body only
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4 General problems
The decisions of the censorship bodies do not appear wholly consistent. The difference
in classifications appear to be a function of minute fine-line distinctions. This approach
maybe appropriate where the question is whether a publication should be confiscated or
prohibited from the country, but is not appropriate where criminal sanctions are imposed.
Under the old regime a person was convicted for selling a handbook on how to grow
marijuana which was unconditionally indecent because it promoted criminal activity, yet a
similar publication advocating law reform and social advocacy of a certain marijuana
lifestyle was classified as restricted.191 It was practically impossible for the defendant to
predict the distinguishing features of the publications, or their consequences.
Despite an extensive attempt to clarify what is objectionable, Parliament has not
removed the ambiguity from the definition of what is objectionable. The impreciseness of the
definition is noted in Adams on Criminal Law:
192
The critical phrase 'injurious to the public good' is open textured and will require
interpretation and application to particular cases. Expression in films, videos, and publications
will fall in a continuum as regards its potential impact on the public good. The point at which
it becomes 'injurious' will not be marked by any bright line.
It may be suggested that this ambiguity is simple because a new regime has been instigated
and that this uncertainty will diminish as a pool of decisions and rules are accumulated.
This may be so of the interpretation of other legislation, but the interpretation of censorship
legislation is peculiarly variable. Kobylka notes that the decision about whether a
publication is objectionable is as much a function of the membership of court or tribunal,
people niaking application or submissions, parties joined to a proceeding as amicus curae,
and public opinion, as it is with the content of the publication.193 Under previous regimes,
New Zealand has seen a high degree a variability in decisions, caused by extrinsic factors,
for example, the homosexual law reform which necessitated a different approach to
interpretation of the censorship legislation.194
to have the opposite view taken by the other body. Even in the absence of s 131(3), it is unclear
whether the doctrine of officially induced error is available in New Zealand in such a situation:
see Adams above n 77, CA25.08, N Cameron Defences and the Crimes Bill (1990) 20 VUWLR Mono 3
66; See Jorgensen above n 108 for a discussion of whether the defence might be available in the
obscenity cases.
191 Quinlan above n 41.
192 Adams above n 77, Ch 10.6.08.
193 Kobylka above n 34.
194 Societyfor the Promotion ofCommunity Standards v Evrard (1988) 7 NZAR 33.
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The strict liability offence operates so that a person cannot argue that they did not know
that a publication had certain characteristics that make it objectionable. Thus many
thousands of people who possess the November 4th edition of the New Truth 6 TV Extra
may be successfully prosecuted. A person may be convicted if they receive a file over the
internet which later is classified as objectionable despite the fact the file may have been
unsolicited or remained "zipped", or not decompressed, on the hard drive.
Equally, if a person is aware of the very characteristics of a publication and seeks legal
advice about whether it is illegal or not, they will have no defence to a charge. The legal
advice may be extremely cogent and may rely on strong precedents from the censorship
bodies.
The objections to the possession offence may be equally applicable to supply offences
which are strict liability. It is arguable, however, that this is less of a concern because
supplying publications places a greater duty on the person to ascertain whether their
conduct is legal. Suppliers will be expected to have a greater knowledge of the rules
governing their industry; they may be able to liaise with enforcement authorities, seek legal
advice, or submit publications to the censorship bodies if they are unsure about their
classification.195 These options are not usually available to a person who simply possesses
a publication.
The supply offences are not, though, confined to persons in the trade. It is possible, and
increasingly common because of current technology, for an individual to casually supply
publications. Such a person could blamelessly supply publications only to be later
convicted under a strict liability offence.
III CONCLUSION AND CALL FOR REFORM
This article has explored the criticisms of strict liability in the context of censorship
legislation and found them justified. Section 131 is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and
Parliament's choice to override the Bill of Rights was based, in part, on incorrect and
inadequate advice from the Attorney-General in his report to Parliament. The strict
liability offence appears to be out of line with the widely accepted criminal law
jurisprudence which requires a subjective approach to guilt. Section 131 also operates
inconsistently with how the offence would be applied, in the absence of the no-defence
provision, according to accepted principles of criminal law and fairness. This is further
illustrated by the comparison with similar obscenity offences in overseas jurisdictions,
where the use of strict or absolute liability has been rejected. This lack of clarity in
censorship law makes a compelling argument that the rule that ignorance of the law is no
195
Department of Justice above n 53, 21.
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excuse should not apply as rigidly in this area. The lack of predicability of decisions under
the FVPCA makes the imposition of criminal sanctions, in the absence of some scienter
requirement, for the possession of an objectionable publication wholly unfair. It follows
that the FVPCA should be amended to remove the no-defence provision and replace it with
an appropriate scienter element.
The United Nations Human Rights Cornmittee has also identified the FVPCA as a
principal area of concern.196 The Committee routinely reports on New Zealand's
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.197 In
considering New Zealand's Third Report to the committee, it commented that:198
In relation to the right of freedom of expression, the Committee expresses its concern over the
vagueness of the term 'objectionable publication' and the fact that Section 121 of the Films,
Videos and Publications Classification Act makes the 'possession of any objectionable
publication' a criminal offence, even if the person concerned has no knowledge or reasonable
cause to believe that the publication is considered as objectionable.
The Committee recommended the amendment of the FVPCA by including a more specific
definition of 'objectionable publication' and by removing criminal liability for possession
without knowledge of or reasonable cause to believe in the objectionality of the material.199
The Board in New Truth acknowledged the report and the criticisms that can be made
about the censorship regime. It noted, however, that it is obliged to apply the FVPCA as it is
clear that Parliament intended that it be applied in that manner, despite the fact that the law
cannot be justified in a free and democratic society.200
The most appropriate reform of the legislation would be the replacement of the no-
defence provision with a defence that, at the time of possession, the defendants had no
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the publication was objectionable.201 This
196
The 1393rd to 1395th meetings of the Committee (CCPR/C/SR.1393 to SR.1395) considering
New Zealand's third periodic report (CCPR/C/64/Add.10 and HRI/CORE/1/Add.33);
Comments published in New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Human Rights in New
Zealand (Information Bulletin No 54, June 1995).
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would mean that defendants could exonerate themselves by proving that they lacked
knowledge of the nature or presence of an objectionable publication. This accords with the
approach taken in overseas jurisdictions.
The Defendants could also prove that they had no reasonable grounds for believing that
the publication would be determined to be objectionable if the publication had not been
classified by the censorship bodies at the time of the possession. This allows a slight
erosion of ignorance of the law is no excuse rule as defendants could successfully assert
that they could not comply with the law because they could not predict the determination of
the censorship bodies.
This lack of reasonable belief would appear to operate on two levels. First, proof that
the accused was aware of the characteristics of a publication under s 3(2) would seem to
automatically give the accused reasonable grounds for believing that the publication is
objectionable and thus no defence is available. Conviction would not be too difficult and
this accords with the apparent intention of Parliament to crack down on hard-core
pornography and violence. Secondly, proof of knowledge of the characteristics under s 3(3)
would not be enough in itself to obtain a conviction; the accused could also argue that the
decision of the censorship body was unpredictable. If, however, the publication or
publications with very similar content had been determined to be objectionable, she would
not be able to assert the defence. An accused may also assert some other basis for
reasonably believing that the publication was not objectionable. This deals with the
concerns at the imposition of criminal sanction in the grey area of what is objectionable.
Basically there must be a very strong likelihood of classification under s 3(3) at the time of
the possession before an accused is found guilty. This allows people who deliberately flout
the law to be convicted, but does not convict morally blameless people who, through no fault
of their own, are not aware that the publications they possess are objectionable.
In summary, the replacement of the no-defence provision with a defence of no knowledge
or reasonable cause to believe that a publication is objectionable will enhance the law by
incorporating basic principles of fairness into the FVPCA, but will still allow for the
effective enforcement of the censorship regime.
